Middle East | Key assessments as Gaza ceasefire agreed

Hamas and Israeli mediators on 15 January agreed to a ceasefire in Gaza. According to reliable regional and international reports, the ceasefire will begin on Sunday, 19 January. Since the agreement was reached, Israeli actions suggest that it will continue to conduct air strikes in Gaza until the ceasefire comes into effect. In our assessment, the deal will help to ease regional conflict risks, at least initially. Iran and pro-Iran groups have long linked their operations to a ceasefire in Gaza.

The proposed timeline for the ceasefire agreement is as follows;

In light of the agreement, we have outlined our main forecasts for conflict in the region over the coming weeks:

• The ceasefire between Hamas and Israel is likely to halt major hostilities in Gaza, at least for the initial six weeks. That said, minor and sporadic skirmishes between Israeli soldiers and Hamas fighters are likely, especially around the areas where Israeli soldiers remain across Gaza
• A lasting end to the fighting between Israel and Hamas is still unlikely. There is currently little indication to suggest an agreement will be reached between the two parties on the future governance of Gaza or the future of Israeli military operations in the area.
• Pro-Iran armed groups are likely to reduce rocket, missile and armed drone attacks against Israel during a truce in Gaza. The Houthis have tied its attacks against Israel (near-daily since December) to a ceasefire in Gaza, although it said this week these would continue until the Israeli military withdraws from Gaza. Still, the group is likely to ease off these operations while a ceasefire holds.
• Ongoing military raids by Israel in the West Bank are likely to continue in the coming months, irrespective of a ceasefire in Gaza. Palestinian and Israeli security forces seem intent on combating Palestinian militancy in the north. Militants are most active in Jenin and Nablus, where Israeli military operations are daily and where the security forces of the Palestinian Authority have separately ramped up operations in recent weeks.
• Military strikes by Iran against Israel are unlikely in the coming weeks. Conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon have slowed down and Iranian proxies in the region have been significantly degraded.
• In Lebanon, the ceasefire reached between Israel and Hezbollah on 26 November will likely be extended beyond its current expiry date of 26 January. Still, the agreement remains liable to collapse, not least because Israel has continued to conduct military strikes since it was agreed.

We assess that the ceasefire in Gaza is likely to hold in the initial six weeks. However, obstacles remain regarding the implementation of its second and third stages. Far-right members of the Israeli government oppose a permanent end to the war without the absolute defeat of Hamas. Israel also appears intent on maintaining its military presence in Gaza. In addition, there seems to be no agreement on the future governance of Gaza. Israel has said on numerous occasions it would not accept any Hamas involvement in this, although it has not publicly proposed any alternative.

Should the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas collapse, daily air strikes by Israel would almost certainly resume across Gaza. There is a high chance that Iran-backed armed groups in the region would restart their operations, including Houthi missile and armed drone attacks against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. Iran would also probably ramp up its rhetoric against Israel. That said, fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon seems unlikely to resume as a result. This is because Hezbollah has been significantly weakened since October, and agreed to the ceasefire with Israel despite the continuing hostilities in Gaza.

In the coming days and weeks, we intend to publish additional reports on conflict-related risks in the region following the ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza.