Israel will almost certainly retaliate against Iran after a ballistic missile attack on 1 October, posing serious risks to aircraft overflying the region in the coming weeks and months
This assessment was issued to clients of Dragonfly’s Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS) on 10 October 2024.
- Brief airspace closures are very likely too, particularly over Israel, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon
- The greatest risk stems from Iranian air defence systems mistakenly targeting civilian aviation at all altitudes
Most commercial airlines are avoiding Iranian, Iraqi and Israeli airspace at the moment. This is because of the potential for Israel to retaliate against Iran after a ballistic missile attack on 1 October, and the associated risks. Those range from falling debris to – in the worst case – Iranian air defence systems mistakenly targeting aircraft (they can do so at any elevation). The latter is particularly likely in western Iran and eastern and northern Iraq. We continue to forecast that Israel is highly likely to take such action in the coming days and weeks.
Brief airspace closures highly likely
Any Israeli operation against Iran – and probable Iranian retaliation – would prompt airspace closures. We assess that these are highly likely in Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Iran in the coming weeks and months. The Israeli Civil Aviation Authority closed its airspace for a few minutes on 1 October. Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese airspace were closed for up to two hours. It appears the Iranian authorities closed the western part of their airspace for at least a few hours.
Main risks are: falling debris and misidentification
In the event of another attack by Iran there would be a high likelihood of debris falling from the sky in Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. This is the result of Israel, the US and Jordan intercepting Iranian projectiles, as happened in all three countries on 1 October. Debris fall is also likely over the Red Sea should the Houthis launch missiles towards Israel. And it is also plausible in Iraq, although we did not see that reported last week.
The greatest risk stems from Iran’s use of air defence weapons to repel Israeli strikes in the coming days and weeks, in our assessment. We strongly doubt Iran would intentionally target a civil aircraft. The Iranian armed forces shot down a Ukrainian plane flying over Tehran in January 2020, killing all the passengers and crew. The authorities at that time admitted that the military had mistaken the aircraft for a hostile target. Air defence operators were expecting an attack by the US after Iran had launched ballistic missiles at US bases in Iraq.
The advice issued by civilian aviation authorities for operations in the region reflects the seriousness of these risks. The UK and Germany for example have recommended operators not to enter the airspace of Iran. Others have issued the same advice for Iraq. Russia has recommended against overflying Israel, Iran or Iraq at night (1600-0600hrs UTC – nighttime is when such operations tend to happen). Although on 9 October the EU Aviation Safety Agency removed a recommendation not to fly to Israel, it still encourages ‘air operators to implement a stringent monitoring process’.
Wider escalation would widen overflight risks
Tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Iran are likely to become frequent and intense in the coming months. And we assess there is a high risk of a sustained military conflict in 2025. That would exacerbate the risks described above. This is primarily because air defence systems operated by militaries in the region would be on even higher alert. A combination of uncertainty and pressure on air defence operators can create a high risk of a miscalculation or error.
US involvement in a regional conflict would very probably also motivate Iran to target its bases in the Gulf. Reuters reported on 9 October that Iran has warned Gulf states against allowing the use of military bases and airspace to attack Iran. An Iranian official said that ‘Tehran will respond accordingly’. The US maintains or has access to bases in most Gulf countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
A wider conflict would also probably involve intensified aerial military activity in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel is conducting an aerial campaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and has been mounting air strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria for several years. Syrian and Hezbollah air defences tend to engage with incoming Israeli projectiles, including fighter jets and drones. They have a varied success rate. And in 2019 a Syrian defensive missile landed in northern Cyprus, seemingly in an attempt to shoot down Israeli jets.
Image: Ground crews prepare an Emirates Boeing 777-300ER aircraft, powering one of its engines with a hundred per cent Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), for a demonstration flight at the Dubai International Airport in Dubai, on 30 January 2023. Photo by Giusepee Cacace/AFP via Getty Images.
