There is a more than even chance that China will step up efforts to interfere with Taiwan-linked cable infrastructure in the coming years
This assessment was issued to clients of Dragonfly’s Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS) on 21 January 2025.
- Taipei has accused China of sabotaging submarine cables three times near the island over the past year, most recently on 4 January
- We do not anticipate that such incidents would cause significant internet outages on the island
There is a more than even chance that China will attempt to sabotage submarine cables around Taiwan in the coming years. Taipei said on 4 January it suspected a Chinese-linked cargo ship had damaged an undersea cable in the north of the island. The Taiwanese authorities have not substantiated the claims; finding direct evidence of cable sabotage is difficult. Still, there are signs that suggest Chinese-linked ships are trying to damage cables intentionally to undermine the Taiwanese authorities. But resulting outages would probably not disrupt most business operations on the island.
Chinese-linked interference in Taiwan increasing
China appears to be intensifying its efforts to undermine the Taiwan authorities using hybrid tactics. Taiwanese officials said on 12 January the number of individuals prosecuted for Chinese espionage had increased over the past two years, with 48 in 2023 and 64 in 2024. Beijing has in recent years tried to do so through espionage, infiltration, influence operations, military exercises and cyberattacks.
In our view, there is a more than even chance that China is seeking to sabotage undersea cables to undermine the Taiwanese government. Accidental damage to subsea cables is relatively common. Fishing trawlers, seismic activity, and anchors are the most common causes, according to data published by the firm TeleGeography in 2017. Still, Taiwanese officials accused China of intentionally sabotaging cable on three occasions since 2023 compared with no such incidents during the previous three years. Beijing has also a demonstrated intent to interfere with Taiwanese infrastructure through covert pressure and cyber operations.
Plausible China-Russia cooperation on subsea cable interference
There are also signs that China and Russia are seeking to cooperate on sabotaging submarine cables. Several European countries have accused Chinese-linked vessels of cutting the Baltic Connector pipeline and two Baltic Sea cables in October 2023 and in November 2024 respectively. In the latter case, Nordic countries suggested that a Chinese-linked vessel did so on behalf of Russia.
It is also plausible that Russian vessels would try to damage subsea cables in the Taiwan Strait on behalf of China. A usually-reliable US-based maritime expert said on X on 14 January that a Russian cargo vessel had loitered near cable landing points south of Taiwan for weeks, although it has since departed. The two countries also conducted several joint naval patrols in the Asia Pacific in 2024. Moscow backs China’s claims to Taiwan, with Russian officials saying in late November 2024 that the US is using Taiwan to ‘generate a crisis in Asia to suit its own…interests’.
Taiwanese unlikely to be able to prevent further incidents
The Taiwanese authorities appear to have limited options to prevent further such incidents. The current international legal framework does not adequately protect undersea cables, making it challenging to deter and punish such actions. This is especially without evidence of direct Chinese involvement. In addition, both China and Taiwan compete for authority in the Taiwan Strait, making it difficult for Taiwan to effectively police vessels without China’s interference.
The area where the incidents occur is also near busy shipping lanes. So the Taiwanese Coast Guard will probably struggle to exhaustively monitor all commercial vessels there. Taipei has said it will step up Coast Guard patrols in areas with submarine cables in response to the incidents. This includes monitoring of ships registered in third countries; the ship accused of cutting the cable earlier this month was Hong Kong-owned but sailed under a Cameroon flag. The authorities added that should these ships come close to undersea cables and within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast, the Coast Guard would board them for investigations.
Image: Two KH-6 Fast Attack Missile Boats sail in formation during a combat readiness exercise at the Zuoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung on 9 January 2025. Photo by I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images.
