US | Assessment of extremist reaction to Harris election win

• The latest polling suggests that Harris holds a slight lead over Donald Trump nationally
• Any incidents of right-wing extremist violence would probably consist of a lone-actor shooting at political, campaign, or electoral officials or staff

A Kamala Harris victory in the presidential election on 5 November would be likely to raise the high threat of right-wing extremist violence after the election. This is especially so after a second failed plot to kill Donald Trump on 15 September. We have not seen calls for revenge in the extremist online channels we monitor. But in our analysis, these events will harden the view among many right-wing extremists that the ‘deep state’ is attempting to prevent Trump from potentially winning the election.

Polarisation and conspiracy theories to sustain high risk of extremist violence

There is notable fervour among right-wing extremists around the vote. That seems to be driven by conspiracy theories about a ‘deep state’ plotting to deny Trump an election victory. Most recently, these theories have been focused on the two failed assassination attempts against him (in July and September), Kamala Harris becoming the Democratic nominee, and the 2020 election being ‘stolen’ from Trump. Strengthening these false narratives is Trump’s suggestion that the only way he would lose is if the elections are unfair.

Trump appears very likely to reject and challenge the election result if he loses. At public events since May, he has said that he would only accept the election results if ‘everything’s honest’. And during a campaign rally in June he said ‘the only way they [Democrats] can beat us is to cheat’. In our analysis of this rhetoric, Trump is creating the basis from which to declare the election outcome illegitimate. These claims have become more common since Harris has overtaken him in some national polls. And follows a similar pattern to the 2020 and 2016 election campaigns.

Since the failed shootings targeting Trump there have not been any calls for violence around the polls. Nor have officials warned of any active plots around the election. But anti-government, militia, and white supremacist adherents are still very active in online channels we monitor. And in its 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment, the DHS warns that ‘some DVEs [domestic violent extremists], particularly those motivated by conspiracy theories and anti-government or partisan grievances, may seek to disrupt electoral processes’.

Disorganised attacks most probable in swing states

Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are where violence would be most likely in the days after media outlets announce unofficial results. The outcomes in these swing states have determined the winner of recent presidential elections – this will almost certainly be the case again this year. Attacks would be particularly likely in states where the projected results suggest Harris won by a very small margin. Illustrating the potential for tight outcomes, Biden won the 2020 election in Arizona by just 10,457 votes and Georgia by 12,670.

These states would be focal points for any local and out-of-state extremists who decide to perpetrate acts of violence. That was how things played out after the 2020 presidential election. But it would be ideologically sympathetic individuals acting independently, rather than as part of an organised group, based on incidents of extremist violence in recent years and the apparent absence of a specific movement to challenge the election outcome. Such attacks would probably consist of shootings targeted at candidates and campaign officials, and most likely occur at sites such as campaign events, political party offices, and government facilities.

We have seen very little to suggest that extremists would target businesses or commercial interests. From our conversations with clients, we understand the main concern for those organisations would be exposure to any violence that occurs near their sites or in places where their staff happen to be. In addition to the use of firearms in attacks, our data and other publicly reported incidents suggest that other violent and non-violent tactics right-wing extremists would potentially use include:

• Doxxing (to publicly identify or publish private information about someone as a form of punishment or revenge) candidates, workers, officials, and officials’ family members
• Fake bomb or shooting threats against federal and local election-related sites
• Arson against election sites and infrastructure (such as ballot drop boxes)
• Attacking or abducting candidates, workers, officials, and officials’ family members

A high-impact coordinated incident or a campaign of attacks across several locations is improbable. Of the 43 right-wing extremist attacks we have recorded since 2021, all were carried out by a lone actor or very small group. Indeed, most official reports about domestic violent extremism in recent years have highlighted the difficulty law enforcement agencies face with attempting to identify and preempt individuals, rather than groups.

Unlike around the 2020 election, right-wing extremists seem focused on local-level activity, rather than coordinated national campaigns. Non-profit reports on domestic extremism in recent years suggest that this strategy shift followed federal investigations into group leaders’ role in organising and participating in the storming of the Capitol building in January 2021, leading to their arrest. To strengthen their resilience to official inquiries and arrests, some groups appear to have formed decentralised, state-based networks.

We have seen the dynamic described above in our monitoring of right-wing extremist online channels. In recent months, videos and photos posted on the telegram channel of the white nationalist group Patriot Front have shown members in local communities across the country distributing promotion material, drawing graffiti of their logos and slogans on public property, and in some cases holding peaceful demonstrations in state capitals. We have also seen Proud Boy (a far-right extremist group) chapters on Telegram recruiting individuals and promoting the channels or pages of affiliates in other states.

Extremist activity would probably continue during the transition period

During the transition period, right-wing activity would probably continue to focus on intimidating and targeting election workers and officials. This would be to prevent the certification of the election results. For example, in October 2022 (before the 2022 midterms), an Iowa man was arrested for threatening to kill election officials in Arizona’s Maricopa County. In our analysis, some extremist actors would be motivated to act as a last-ditch attempt to alter the election outcome.

Attempts by the Trump campaign to challenge the results would, in our view, sustain the high potential for right-wing extremists to intimidate or violently target election workers and officials. This includes election workers and judges who are part of local and state judicial systems tasked with verifying the election results. Based on similar activity in 2020, this would most likely consist of issuing violent threats to workers and officials, and organising armed and peaceful rallies outside of official buildings.

Violent clashes between left-wing and right-wing extremists are also likely during the transition period. In at least a dozen instances after the 2020 election, left-wing groups such as Antifa (short for anti-fascists) and far-right groups, such as the Proud Boys, engaged in violent physical clashes during protests over the election result. Based on incident data from our partner The Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED), these incidents occurred in California, Washington DC, Iowa, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, and involved isolated stabbings and shootings.

Inauguration likely to pass off smoothly

Inauguration Day (scheduled for 20 January 2025 in Washington DC) is likely to pass off peacefully. This is because there will almost certainly be a major security plan in place for the day’s proceedings, as during past inaugurations. And following the storming of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021, police and intelligence agencies updated and expanded their planning procedures, intelligence-gathering capabilities, and intelligence-sharing practices.

We anticipate that this would probably be the case nationally as well. This is because most law enforcement agencies will be at a very high state of alert for any potential violence or unrest regardless of who wins the presidential election.