West & Central Africa | Africa Corps expansion continues

• Moscow appears to be consolidating its presence in West and Central Africa by replacing the Wagner Group with the Africa Corps
• A CAR military official said last month that Moscow is demanding Wagner mercenaries be replaced by Africa Corps recruits imminently
• Russia is likely to continue to seek to expand its influence into other countries in the region in the coming years, such as Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and Cameroon

Russia appears to be in the final stages of replacing its state-linked security contractor, Wagner Group, with the paramilitary force, the Africa Corps, in Africa. In early June, the Africa Corps replaced Wagner in Mali. And a military official from the Central African Republic (CAR) cited in press reports last month said that Moscow is demanding a similar transition there. Moscow probably intends to tighten its grip on its paramilitary operations in West and Central Africa, with the aim of entrenching its presence in the region and consolidating access to mineral and natural resources there.

This shift from Wagner towards the Africa Corps is unlikely to significantly alter Russia’s activities in West and Central Africa. Russian mercenaries have so far struggled to contain jihadist and separatist insurgencies in countries where they are present. They also often employ disinformation campaigns to exacerbate anti-Western sentiment and advance their interests. Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea are probably key targets for a further expansion of the Africa Corps presence over the coming years.

Africa Corps set to replace Wagner in Africa

The Africa Corps is now in control of operations in four of the six countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Libya) where Russian security contractors operate in Africa. Most recently, Wagner announced on its Telegram channel in early June that it had ‘accomplished’ its mission in Mali. The group’s activities centred on fighting jihadist and separatist insurgencies, and providing security protection to the junta. The Africa Corps subsequently announced it had started supporting Bamako ‘on a more fundamental level’.

Moscow consolidating control over assets in the region

We assess that the transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps points to Russia’s desire to formalise its control over operations there. Contrary to Wagner, the Africa Corps falls under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence. Africa has become more strategically important to Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, and so tightening its grip on mercenary operations is likely a priority for Moscow. By strengthening its political and military ties in Africa, it can notably bypass economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, secure political support for its foreign policy, and manpower and resources for the Ukraine war.

The CAR is very likely to be Moscow’s next priority for transitioning between the two groups. Bangui seems to be reluctant to accept this. Wagner has had an established presence in the country since 2018. But a CAR military official cited in the Associated Press last month said that Moscow has demanded ‘significant sums of money’ for the transition. Still, we assess that Bangui lacks the leverage to oppose this. Russia continues to be the country’s main – if not only – security partner.

This transition is unlikely to significantly impact the conduct of Russian mercenary operations in Mali and across the continent, however. The Africa Corps’ tactics largely reflect those of Wagner. These seem to include providing security protections to regimes and military assistance against militant groups, using disinformation campaigns to discredit Western influence, and securing access to natural resources. In a sign of this, 70-80% of the Africa Corps’ recruits are former Wagner mercenaries, according to a Dakar-based think tank.

Probable target countries for the group

We assess that Guinea, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are likely targets for expansion in the coming years. Guinea and Cameroon are already key logistical hubs for Russian mercenaries, who are using the ports in Conakry and Douala to transport military equipment or commercial goods in and out of Mali and the CAR respectively, according to local press reports. And formalising the Africa Corps’ presence through long-term agreements with authorities would secure its access to the port and free-flowing transit routes into West Africa.

There are already signs that the group is building a presence in Equatorial Guinea. Around 200 suspected Africa Corps military instructors arrived in the capital in November 2024, according to international press outlets, to provide military training and protection to the president. And local media reported in January that Russia and Equatorial Guinea had drafted mooring agreements for the port cities of Malabo and Bata. Russia is probably seeking to secure collaboration in the oil and gas sectors there.

Disinformation to remain a key tool in Africa Corps operations

Russia is very likely to continue to use disinformation campaigns to consolidate its position in the region. This has been an established tactic in recent years to advance its interests and exacerbate anti-Western sentiment. Moscow routinely uses fake social media accounts to disseminate its narratives or pays local media outlets and local influencers to do so. We have seen such tactics utilised widely in Mali and Burkina Faso. As well as evidence of influence campaigns in countries where mercenaries are not present, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa.

Upcoming elections are likely to be a particular focus of influence campaigns in the coming year, especially in Cameroon, the CAR and Benin. Presidential elections are scheduled for 12 October 2025, 28 December 2025 and 12 April 2026, respectively. Russia will probably use fake social media accounts to pose as locals and disseminate narratives that praise Russia and stir up anti-Western sentiment, as seen in the previous election in the CAR in 2021. Any campaign will likely seek to undermine candidates more closely aligned with the West.

Disinformation campaigns specifically targeting foreign companies are plausible but unlikely. We have only observed a handful of such cases in recent years. These took place exclusively in the CAR and targeted direct competitors to Wagner, such as American rival security company and a French brewer in 2023. We are not aware of any other such instances since then.

Russian mercenary presence unlikely to significantly raise risks for businesses

Influence campaigns appear to be exacerbating already-existing anti-Western sentiment in Burkina Faso, Mali and the CAR. Russian online campaigns have directly organised a handful of anti-Western protests in Bangui in 2023 and 2024, according to local press outlets. It is also plausible that these campaigns emboldened anti-Western protests in Bangui, Bamako and Ouagadougou. But these have been sporadic and largely peaceful. And most were directed at diplomatic and political presence rather than commercial firms.

We assess that acts of violence against Western businesses or nationals are very unlikely over the coming year. In 2023, Wagner reportedly conducted an arson attack against French brewery Castel in Bangui. But we are not aware of any other similar incidents across the region since. And while in past conversations with contacts in Mali, they reported occasional harassment of foreign employees by Russian mercenaries, such instances seem to be rare. There is also little evidence that influence campaigns have motivated local nationals to conduct acts of violence against Western firms and staff.

Proliferation of jihadist activities unlikely to wane

The Africa Corps is highly unlikely to be more effective than Wagner in countering jihadists in the Sahel. Groups, like the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, have greatly expanded the scope of their operations in recent years. Signalling this, JNIM is now four times larger than in 2022, according to a recent statement by the head of the US Africa Command. And it has mounted several complex, high-casualty assaults this year, including in major cities. We also expect that the Africa Corps will focus more on training and intelligence sharing with the junta instead of active participation in counterterrorism operations.