Myanmar | Earthquake compounding conflict risks

• Armed fighting between military and rebel groups will probably intensify this year, despite severe operational and travel disruption
• Commercial flights to Mandalay and Naypyidaw will also probably be limited in the coming months due to critical damage

A profound humanitarian and governance crisis in Myanmar is unlikely to end anytime soon. After a major earthquake last week, the military junta has quickly used the disaster to advance its conflict with opposition armed groups. This includes blocking aid to areas rebels control. Based on the junta’s behaviour during past crises, it is also probable it will either bring forward a general election, or proceed with it as planned in December or January 2026, to create a semblance of legitimacy. With little to suggest it would be free or fair, this will probably sustain the armed conflict well into 2026.

Severe and widespread disruption to operations and travel in the country is also very likely to persist in the coming months. Airports in Mandalay and Naypydaw are severely damaged; flights to those have been redirected to Yangon. Foreign assistance teams have been arriving in Myanmar in recent days to help recovery efforts. But these will probably be hampered by weak infrastructure, a result of four years of civil conflict. We have raised our crisis risk rating for Myanmar from severe to critical.

The military continues to wage civil war

The junta seems likely to prioritise fighting rebels over post-earthquake rescue efforts. The opposition National Unity Government, which coordinates dozens of armed rebel groups, on 30 March called for a two-week ceasefire (until 13 April). There are few signs the military will observe this; it has already mounted air strikes in recent days, including in the city of Shan State only a few hours after the earthquake on 28 March.

The location of earthquake-related destruction is also driving the junta’s actions. Areas controlled by opposition groups appear to have been less damaged than those where the government still holds sway; Sagaing region is the exception. Based on available information, the military-controlled regions of Mandalay and Naypyidaw are most affected. As a result, fighting in Myanmar is very likely to continue – and even intensify – in the coming weeks and months.

The earthquake also provides the junta with an opportunity militarily. In recent months, it has been on the back foot in several regions, such as in the Rakhine State where groups are encroaching on the capital, Sittwe. The military has used past crises for its gain. One instance was the distribution of aid according to its preferences in the aftermath of Cyclone Nagris in 2008. And local press reports in recent days suggest the military is now blocking aid to the earthquake-affected Sagaing region.

In addition to fighting, the junta will also probably use an upcoming general election to strengthen its legitimacy. In early March, the military announced plans to hold the first polls since it returned to power in 2021, either in December 2025 or January 2026. On current indications, it is difficult to see how the vote would be free or fair. This is due to issues around potential voter list manipulation, exclusion of areas where there is fighting, or efforts by the junta to marginalise opposition parties.

However, with the current emergency, there is a more than even chance that the junta will try to bring the election forward, or proceed without resolving some of the issues around the vote’s legitimacy. For instance, after the cyclone in 2008, the junta went ahead with a planned referendum only one week after the storm, implementing major constitutional changes that further entranched its power.

Outlook for potential offensive by armed groups

It is too early to judge if the earthquake will be a catalyst for a more united rebel offensive against the junta. But it is plausible. Most damage is limited to areas controlled by the military. And there have been reports of the junta’s handling of the earthquake – especially in the aftermath of the air strikes – has added another grievance among the public opposition towards the authorities. Further signs that the military is seeking to take advantage of the situation would probably galvanise popular opposition against the junta.

Creating a single, unified armed opposition front would require significant coordination among many disparate groups. But there is a precedent of some coming together to make significant gains against the military; several ethnic rebel groups launched a coordinated offensive in northern Shan State, expanding its territory in 2023.

Crisis risk raised to critical amid widespread disruption

Regardless of how the conflict develops, widespread and severe operational and travel disruption is all but certain to persist in many areas this year. Local press reports suggest the earthquake has collapsed buildings and cracked roads; the bodies of at least 2,000 people have reportedly been found so far. Four years of civil conflict have led to buildings being damaged both by war fighting and neglect. So, any repair works will probably last into 2026 at least; we are raising our countrywide infrastructure risk rating from severe to critical.

The already dire humanitarian situation will also probably worsen further. Electricity shortages were already a frequent occurrence in cities and are likely to become more prolonged in Mandalay and Naypyidaw. The junta has yet to hint at whether it will change its position to allow aid into opposition-controlled areas, or if it would seek concessions from rebels to do this. But its continuing to block aid to conflict areas would further exacerbate existing shortages of food, medicine and water in these regions.

Disruption to airport infrastructure

Commercial flights into and out of Myanmar are likely to be severely restricted in the coming months. The earthquake caused severe damage to airports in Mandalay and Naypyidaw. In the latter, this includes the collapse of the air traffic control tower. Both airports are closed to civilian flights indefinitely as a result, according to local press reports.

The junta has yet to publicly announce any timeframes for reopening Mandalay and Naypyidaw airports. But given the extent of the damage press outlets have reported, we very much doubt the authorities will fully restore operations this month. Most flights will probably continue to be diverted to the airport in Yangon, which remains functional. However, Yangon is also handling relief flights, so that its capacity will probably be limited in the coming weeks.