Russia | Nuclear escalation risks

• Moscow has repeatedly warned it would lower its threshold for using nuclear weapons if Ukraine’s allies allowed it to fire their long-range missiles into Russia; as appears to have happened last night, 18 November
• Russia is much more likely to escalate through covert operations and sabotage, targeting critical infrastructure and undermining the socio-economic stability of Ukraine’s European allies

Russia is likely to issue verbal threats against NATO, including strong hints at nuclear escalation, in the coming days. President Putin signed today, 19 November, a revised nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike. This appears to be a response to mainstream outlets’ reports on 17 November that the US has permitted Ukraine to use long-range missiles inside Russia, and a subsequent reported strike into the Bryansk region today. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that it would interpret such a missile strike as NATO directly intervening in the war.

We assess that the likelihood of a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine or NATO is very low. That is even though under the new doctrine, Russia could use nuclear weapons not only against Ukraine but also against the US in case of a mass Ukrainian attack, including drone and missile strikes on its territory. As with other threats by Russia since 2022, this change, and any further bellicose rhetoric against the West, would be largely aimed at deterring or delaying yet further support for Ukraine. Using a nuclear weapon would plausibly prompt a military response by NATO, which Russia does not appear willing to risk at present.

US permission still contains limits

President Biden has yet to publicly comment on Ukraine using long-range US missiles inside Russia. But press reports suggest that the priority will be countering what looks to be a new Russian offensive in the Kursk region. A 50,000-strong Russian contingent, including North Korean forces, has gathered to push Ukrainians out of there. The same accounts cite US officials as saying the US move to allow the use of these missiles is not designed to change the course of the war in Ukraine’s favour, but to boost its defences.

Russian nuclear sabre rattling is a part of strategic communication

Putin has already stepped up rhetorical threats against the West in response, and would almost certainly continue to do so should Ukraine use these weapons yet deeper into Russian territory. This morning, he approved a pre-prepared revised nuclear doctrine. Moscow had repeatedly equated the use of long-range weapons in Russia with NATO’s direct involvement and significant escalation in the conflict. Significantly, under the new doctrine, the Kremlin’s remit of retaliation extends not only to Ukraine but also to its nuclear allies.

In response to Kyiv requesting permission to use longer-range missiles, Putin announced on 25 September that he would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. He said that the new clauses in the doctrine cover cases of mass drone attacks and strikes against Russia by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear one. This seems to be a direct reference to Ukraine’s airstrikes on Russian territory using Western weapons, including those delivered by nuclear states – France, the UK and the US.

We still assess that it is very unlikely that Russia will use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict. This is partly because the purported changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine appear to be largely rhetorical. According to Russian experts interviewed by media outlet Meduza on 27 September, clauses permitting Russian nuclear retaliation on non-nuclear states have already been in place since 1995. Russian officials have also repeatedly raised the need to revise the doctrine since the country’s withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear Tests Ban Treaty in 2023.

Any threats about a nuclear escalation will probably seek to remind Ukraine’s allies of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, rather than signalling a greater or imminent intent to use them. The latest revisions to the nuclear doctrine were made just a day ahead of a meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and the US over expanding Ukraine’s use of US weapons. So the announcement was very likely an attempt to influence the decision-making on permitting the use of Western missiles inside Russia.

Indicators of nuclear escalation

Despite it being very unlikely that Russia would use nuclear weapons, under the current conflict conditions, we continue to monitor for ways in which this scenario might become more likely. Specifically, these would be Russia:

• restarting nuclear tests and unscheduled strategic arms exercises (Unlikely (20-40%))
• repositioning nuclear launchpads, arming patrol bombers with nuclear missiles (Reasonable chance (40-50%))
• withdrawing from the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), enabling the overt transfer of nuclear technology to Iran and North Korea (Likely (60-80%))

All of these indicators would become more likely if Ukraine was permitted by NATO (not just the US) countries to use long-range weapons to target sites inside Russia. They all fall short of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, but would rather push up the chances of this happening through miscalculation.

Russia is likely to intensify hybrid warfare operations

Russia is much more likely to respond to Ukraine’s use of Western long-range missiles through clandestine and deniable activities, rather than resorting to nuclear warfare. This includes sabotage and efforts to incite civil unrest among Ukraine’s allies. There has been a ‘sharp increase in acts of espionage and sabotage’ across Europe over the past two years, according to statements by UK and German spy chiefs. This includes arson and explosions at military-industrial sites, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns.

Ukrainian gains or successful resistance in the Kursk region against Russian forces over the next few months would very probably prompt Russia to expand these tactics. This could include targeting critical European infrastructure, such as gas and oil pipelines, submarine internet cables, munitions factories, or key commercial hubs like ports and cargo terminals. Another possibility is targeting energy infrastructure around operational Ukrainian nuclear power plants to cause emergency reactor shutdowns.

As of yet, uncovered sabotage plots have been rather low-impact. That seems to be partly because European security agencies are on high alert after catching a number of spies in Poland, Germany and the UK over the last year or so. Russia has also struggled to bring some plots to fruition. Various European governments have expelled what they say were intelligence officers disguised as diplomats across Europe since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. As a result, Russia seems to be resorting to proxies recruited via Telegram to carry out sabotage actions.

As Ukraine is receiving significant support from the West, Russia will also very probably increase military cooperation with its allies over the coming year. Faced with production bottlenecks, sanctions and labour shortages, Russia’s military-industrial complex is almost certain to exchange advanced nuclear and missile technologies with Iran and North Korea in return for conventional weapons and manpower support. This could provide Iran and its proxies or North Korea with missiles, heightening regional security and interstate conflict risks. Media reports of Iranian hypersonic missiles breaching Israel’s air defences during the 1 October strikes underscore these growing concerns.